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What is Protocol Analysis?
Francien Dechesne, Jan van Eijck, Wouter Teepe,
Yanjing Wang
The following is a transcript of one of the discussion sessions that took place
during the Workshop on Games, Action and Social Software at the
Lorentz Center in Leiden. The discussion theme was set by the workshop
organizers: “Is logic useful for the analysis of protocols, and if so, how?” The
theme has attracted the usual protagonists, plus a cognitive scientist and a
specialist in computer security.
Logician: The workshop organizers have asked me to chair this session. I
suppose the first thing we should establish is that everyone present here un-
derstands the question at hand in the same way.
Philosopher: Well, I could definitely use some clarification. A protocol is
generally understood to be some set of rules or conventions, but that is very
broad. I’m afraid I do not have a clear picture of what is meant by protocol
analysis. Could anyone explain this to me?
Cognitive Scientist: In cognitive science, protocol analysis is the name of
an experimental method for gathering so-called intermediate state evidence
concerning the procedures used by a human to compute a function. More in
particular, subjects are trained to think aloud as they solve a problem, and
their verbal behavior forms the basic data to be analyzed.
Philosopher: This sounds as if the analysis is understood as reconstructing or
mimicking the protocol that is (assumed to be) used by this human. Do I see
this correctly? Maybe you could give a more concrete example.
Cognitive Scientist: Well, standard examples of protocols we analyze are the
mechanisms people use to solve brainteaser problems. You can think of the
following “crypt-arithmetical problem”: (Writes on the whiteboard.)
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D O N A L D
G E R A L D +
R O B E R T
Let it be given that D = 5. How do you solve this?
Computer Scientist: May I? Let us see. If D = 5 then T = 0, from the last
column. From the first column we know that G + 5 = R, so R ≥ 5. From
the second column we then get that E has to be 0. This gives A = 5 from
column four, and there has to be a carry to column three. Looking at the
fifth column, we see that L = 2 would give R = 5 and G = 0. Let’s pursue
this. In column three, we could set N = 1, which yields B = 7, as there was
a carry from column four. The value of O is not constrained. Let’s set it to
1. We are done:
5 1 1 5 2 5
0 0 5 5 2 5 +
5 1 7 0 5 0
But this solution is far from unique. As remarked, we could have picked any
other value for O to get a solution. Also, we could have chosen L = 3, which
would have given R = 7 and G = 2, again for different values of O. Or
L = 4. . .
Philosopher: Yes, I think we get the point. In cognitive science, the next step
of what you call protocol analysis would be to analyze this verbal description
of how our computer scientist solved the puzzle.
Cognitive Scientist: Yes, we would now use this so-called verbal protocol to
infer the subject’s problem space.
Philosopher: What do you mean by “problem space”?
Cognitive Scientist: The problem space is a set of rules that are used to
transform knowledge states concerning the problem.
Philosopher: So these are just postulated?
Cognitive Scientist: That’s right. Once one has a suitable problem space,
one can proceed to create a problem behavior graph, supposed to reflect state
transitions as subjects search through the problem space in their attempts to
solve the problem.
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Computer Scientist: I see what you mean. So a problem space is just a labeled
transition system viewed as a search space. If you give me a finite search space
I can give you any number of solution algorithms for your problem.
Cognitive Scientist: Yes, and the task of protocol analysis is to pinpoint the
particular search algorithms that reflect how humans do it. Finally, one can
compare the verbal protocol to the computer simulation, to validate the as-
sumptions that led to the simulating program. Once validated, the simulating
program provides a rich description of the processing steps performed by the
human subject. Two classic books dealing with the subject are [4] and [7].
Logician: OK, I think this interpretation of term “protocol analysis” is clear
now. But I have the feeling the term has quite a different meaning in computer
science, is that right?
Security Analyst: Indeed, protocol analysis in computer science refers to a
quite different activity. In computer security, we are concerned with the design
and specification of communication protocols, and with checking whether they
fulfill the given goal and/or satisfy the desired properties.
Any protocol that is designed to satisfy some kind of security property, can
be called a security protocol. Such properties may be about trust, or about
fairness (making sure that agents can’t cheat), but for this discussion, maybe
it’s best to restrict ourselves a bit. A more narrow class of security proto-
cols would be the communication protocols (i.e. sets of rules for sending and
receiving messages), in which it is ensured that particular pieces of informa-
tion are kept secret from certain parties, or in which it is ensured that you’re
talking to the agent you intend to talk to: authentication.
Logician: So security protocols are formal constraints on communication pat-
terns that are meant to ensure some agents get to know something while
outsiders remain in the dark, or that ensure that you know whom you’re talk-
ing to. It sounds as if the protocols ensure certain epistemic properties of the
communication. This relates to our central question, whether logic can be
useful for protocol analysis. It seems we have a perfect working place here for
epistemic logic: the logic for reasoning about knowledge.
Cognitive Scientist: I am sorry, but I don’t really understand. I have trouble
with vague formulations like “get to know something” and “outsiders”. What
is it that should be analyzed? The protocol? Properties of the protocol,
properties of the parties participating in the protocol?
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Philosopher: Actually, there was a talk at this workshop addressing such
questions, by Francien Dechesne and Yanjing Wang. It was about how security
protocols can be analyzed, and a link was made with dynamic epistemic logic.
As an example of a security protocol, they mentioned the Needham-Schroeder
public key authentication protocol. Maybe it’s good to use that example to
clarify the terminology a bit?
Cognitive Scientist: That’s a good idea, for I missed that talk, I am afraid.
What is this Needham-Schroeder protocol supposed to do? And how does it
achieve its purpose?
Security Analyst: Before we state the actual protocol, we need some prelimi-
nary notions and assumptions. For one thing, we assume that every agent a
owns a private (secret) key to decrypt messages that were encrypted with the
publicly available key PKa. By the way, does everyone know how public key
encryption works?
Computer Scientist: Shall I explain? Public key encryption is a nice example
of how work in pure mathematics (in this case, number theory) may suddenly
and unexpectedly turn out to have high practical relevance. Public key en-
cryption is based on the existence of mathematical operations that are very
difficult to reverse. For example, multiplication of two large prime numbers
is easy, but finding the prime factors of a very large number is extremely
difficult: if I tell you, for instance, that 7879 and 5113 are primes, then it is
very easy for you to calculate their product. But suppose instead of this I tell
you that 40285327 is the product of two primes, and challenge you to produce
these primes. . .
Cognitive Scientist: But if you give me one factor, it is easy to find the other.
So I guess the key is supposed to be some number or maybe other piece of
information that makes the reversal operation very easy to do?
Computer Scientist: You got it. And it should be understood that for really
large numbers, without the key, sophisticated guesses or even supercomputers
would be of no help. No known method for finding the prime factors of a
number is substantially better than trial and error.
Security Analyst: Yes, then with some tricks, for example by applying the RSA
algorithm [8] we could have one-to-one functions f on the natural numbers
with the property that computing f(N) is easy if you know the “public key”,
even for very large N , while computing f−1(M) for large M is extremely
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difficult without knowing the “secret key”.
Actually, for our analysis, we don’t have to go into all the mathematical
details. We can leave that to the specialized mathematicians, the cryptogra-
phers. In security protocol analysis it is the custom to keep the mathematics
behind the encryption outside the model. This is called the black box approach
to cryptography. It is enough to just assume that such keys exist.
Logician: I see. So, the relevant part is that we may assume the existence
of some “practically unbreakable” encryption functions, that allow anyone to
encrypt a message—using the public key of the intended receiver—but only
allows the possessor of the secret key to decrypt it.
Security Analyst: Right. Let me now write down the Needham-Schroeder
protocol. Its purpose is to make sure that two agents who are communicating
with each other can identify their correspondent. It assumes that the private
keys are kept secret, and the public keys are available for all, so that every
agent can create messages that can be read by one and only one agent. Here
it is: (Writes on the whiteboard:)
Message 1 a→ b : {na, a}PKb
Message 2 b→ a : {na, nb}PKa
Message 3 a→ b : {nb}PKb
Here na is a so-called nonce. . .
Cognitive Scientist: Nonce? Sounds like nonsense. . .
Security Analyst: In a sense it is non-sense. A nonce is a very big arbitrary
number that a has privately generated. It is assumed that it is impossible for
others to have a clever guess. How such numbers can be generated is also left
to the cryptographers.
Cognitive Scientist: But still there’s one thing rather unclear to me. Why
doesn’t the first message simply consist of a public-key encoded {a}PKb?
Why the nonce? I mean, it’s now encrypted, right?
Security Analyst: Well, this nonce serves as a kind of time stamp. It was
generated just for the purpose of this particular message, as a kind of challenge
for b. It is a better challenge than a’s name, which may be rather easy to
guess.
Logician: Let us see. So the first message that a sends to b consists of a pair
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of a nonce na and the name of a, encrypted with the public key of b. These
public keys are there for grabs, remember. But only b can decrypt this and
get hold of na and a. Now b creates his own nonce nb, and sends the pair of
the two nonces na and nb back to a, encrypted with a’s public key.
Philosopher: Presumably, this is meant to prove to a that this message is
indeed from b. Only a can decrypt this, so the final message, where a sends
nb back to b encrypted with b’s public key, is supposed to prove to b that he
is indeed talking to a. But how can we be certain that the protocol is secure?
Security Analyst: This is the interesting but tricky field of verification of
security protocols. For example, the Needham-Schroeder protocol was first
proved secure using a special “logic of authentication”, but later it was found
to contain a security hole after all.
Logician: (Looks challenged, and thinks out loud) But then this logical analysis
did not adequately cover the essentials of the protocol. I mean, it is not so clear
what verification of the protocol means. What, exactly, are the properties we
should check? Informally, the protocol should ensure that a and b know with
whom they have been interacting. I guess this means that they should both
know the values of na and nb. Moreover, it should be known to a and b that
no one else knows the values of na and nb. I suppose one would need epistemic
logic to check such properties. . .
Security Analyst: (Interrupts) The attack on the Needham-Schroeder protocol
was detected ten years ago, using process-theoretic tools [5]. The protocol
itself is from as early as [6]. The “correctness proof” was given in [1], in the
paper which introduced the logic of authentication, which was baptized BAN-
logic after the authors. To their credit one should say that, even if their proof
was flawed, their paper initiated the now active field of verification of security
protocols. By the way, Needham himself once described security protocols as
“three line programs that people still manage to get wrong”. Well, he was
right in this particular case.
Logician: I am curious, both about the logic and about the attack.
Security Analyst: About the logic. . . You’ll be interested to learn that it rea-
sons about beliefs in a very abstract way, by specifying inference rules for that.
But I would say that it has no sensible semantics.
Logician: Well, that makes it hard to talk about soundness and completeness,
I guess.
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Security Analyst: Lowe’s attack, however, is easily explained. Assume a ini-
tiates a session with c, whom she trusts. So a sends {na, a}PKc . Instead of
responding as specified by the protocol, c passes the message on to b, encoded
with b’s public key. b now thinks he is talking to a and sends {na, nb}PKa
back. This is intercepted by c and forwarded to a later. Now a still thinks she
is running the protocol in interaction with c, so she responds with {nb}PKc .
To conclude the protocol with b, c decrypts this message and encrypts it with
b’s public key to forward the nonce to b. So b ends up with the mistaken
belief that he is talking to a, while he is in fact talking to c: (writes on the
whiteboard)
Message 1 a→ c : {na, a}PKc
Message 1’ c(a)→ b : {na, a}PKb
Message 2 b→ c(a) : {na, nb}PKa
Message 2’ c→ a : {na, nb}PKa
Message 3 a→ c : {nb}PKc
Message 3’ c(a)→ b : {nb}PKb
When I write c(a) I mean c masquerading as a. This compromises the pro-
tocol, for it is clear that after this session b mistakenly believes that b and a
are the only ones who know na and nb. Also, a has the mistaken belief that
a and c are the only ones knowing these nonces.
Computer Scientist: This is all going much too fast. Can we go back to the
very first line of the Needham-Schroeder protocol, please? (He points at the
first line of the original protocol, still on the whiteboard.)
Message 1 a→ b : {na, a}PKb
This says that agent a sends a message to b consisting of the nonce na and
the name a, but encrypted by b’s public key. Now a sends to b. . .
Security Analyst: That is not the whole story. In the analysis of security
protocols we always assume that there could be some bad guys who are trying
to gain information or spoil communication. In an actual run according to
the protocol, an eavesdropper might also receive this message. But assuming
that the eavesdropper does not have b’s private key, he does not really learn
anything from it.
Cognitive Scientist: “Not really learn anything” is too vague for me.
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Philosopher: And what do you mean by an actual run “according to the
protocol”?
Security Analyst: (Sighs) OK. (Turns to Cognitive Scientist. ) “Not really
learn anything” means that if the eavesdropper tries to guess the content of
the decrypted message, there is no algorithm using the encrypted message that
is significantly faster than an algorithm that just performs random guesses.
Please don’t ask me to write down the definitions, they are long, technical,
and boring.
Logician: But wait. I think the eavesdropper does learn something! At least
he now knows that there was a message being sent intended for someone.
Security Analyst: Yes, but does it mean anything useful to him?
Logician: Well, that depends on the circumstances. He may learn from it that
a run is going on, for instance. Maybe it is useful for him to reason about
other stuff in the remaining run. I feel dynamic epistemic logic could help
here to express such subtleties, and then it may become visible whether it can
be useful. . . (Smiles and drifts away in thoughts.)
Philosopher: Interesting indeed, but what about my question? What do you
mean by “according to the protocol”?
Security Analyst: Ah, I meant that the pattern of the actual actions matches
the protocol specification.
Philosopher: Ahem, that is still not completely clear. You specified action
patterns from an outsider’s perspective. But what about the agents’ perspec-
tive? How do they know what they should do to arrive at a run “according
to the protocol”?
Computer Scientist: Maybe we should require that the protocol specification
also contain the preconditions for agents to do a certain action according to
the protocol. Then we know what are the possible runs.
Security Analyst: I see your point. Actually, for traditional security protocol
verification, using model checking, a run generator—which produces all the
possible runs according to the protocol specifications—is crucial. The precon-
ditions for the actions are always implicitly assumed to arise from some kind
of pattern matching. For example, as presented in [2], the author assumes
that trusted agent b will send message {V, nb}PKa whenever he reads message
{V, a}PKb according to the Needham-Schroeder protocol. Here V is just a
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variable which can be instantiated in a specific run.
Cognitive Scientist: Okay, that sounds reasonable. After all, the agents them-
selves can’t see that V is indeed the nonce na generated by a. It shouldn’t
be in the preconditions of the actions. I would expect names of agents would
sometimes be variables as well.
Security Analyst: Yes. In fact we call the names “roles” in the protocol
specifications since in the actual runs any number of agents can be involved
in multiple sessions. One particular agent can be acting the a role in one
session but the b role in another session.
Computer Scientist: Yet another complication.
Security Analyst: I am afraid it cannot be helped. However, the variables
we introduced give us executable protocol specifications for every agent. The
possible runs—or the possible action sequences—are the sequences in which
every action’s precondition was satisfied after the execution of the previous
action.
Logician: Let us go back to the attack. I am still not fully satisfied there. For
example, in the description of the attack, the agents look a bit gullible. If I
were b, I wouldn’t have believed that what I just received was straight from
a. And if I had seen something going on between a and c, I might even have
discontinued the run. In other words, if I knew about the possible attack, I
would be suspicious upon receiving the message {a, na}PKb . It seems that you
assume all the agents have so much faith in the protocol that they suspend
their own judgement.
Security Analyst: I see what you mean. But maybe you should bear in mind
that an agent need not be human. Think of the agents as communicating
processors. They don’t have reasoning power, or a will of their own.
Philosopher: (towards the logician) If you give the agents unlimited reason-
ing power, as you seem to suggest, they turn into a kind of perfect logicians.
Which means that they will be able to find out about possible attacks be-
forehand, by analyzing the protocol as you would analyze it yourself. Or in
the way Lowe analyzed the Needham-Schroeder protocol. Just imagine. You
then assume that if there exists an attack, they will discover it, and then they
refuse to conduct any run: “We know we are under threat of attack”. And
then all security analysts will lose their jobs. . . (smiles)
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Logician: But at least we have to make explicit what the reasoning and ob-
servation powers of the agents are. Maybe for different situations we need
different assumptions.
Computer Scientist: It seems to me that our discussion has revealed quite a
list of tacit assumptions. Why don’t we try and make a list?
Cognitive Scientist: Yeah!
Security Analyst: Well, we did not yet discuss assumptions about the bad
guys. A model where such a bad guy is assumed to exist is called an intruder
model or threat model. An intruder model that is well-known is the so-called
Dolev-Yao model [3]. In this model it is assumed that the intruder has com-
plete control over the communication channel. That is, he can intercept every
message, delete messages at will, and insert messages into the communication
channel. Of course, the model is supposed to be realistic about what intruders
can do and cannot do. It is assumed that the intruder cannot work magic. An
intruder can only insert messages that can be construed in polynomial time
on the basis of the information he already possesses.
Philosopher: So, if I look at the first message of the Needham-Schroeder
protocol, the a → b only means that it prescribes a to send some message,
but there is no guarantee that b gets the message, nor, if b gets some message,
that he can be sure that the message he receives originates from a. Is that
correct?
Security Analyst: Yes. But we do assume that the encryption works as it
should: the message sent there can only be decrypted by agent b. Recall that
we treat the cryptographic primitives as perfect black boxes [9]. Thus, hashes,
encryption, decryption and what-have-you all exist, and work as they should.
We don’t worry about the mathematical foundations of their existence, or
about details of their implementation. By the way, this does not mean that
cryptographic primitives are not interesting: For example the definition of
what a cryptographic hash should do has been in a constant flux over the
last twenty years. I won’t go into details here, but I recommend reading [10,
chapter 3] for a nice wrap-up of this history.
Cognitive Scientist: Hello? I thought you were all doing exact sciences. Now I
am surprised how much is still under debate, and how dubious your verification
methods are. Like this BAN-logic, which has no semantics and which proves
flawed protocols correct. Deep maths is not a guarantee for maturity, or is it?
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By the looks of it, your discipline is still in its infancy. Just like ours, in fact.
Computer Scientist: We’re not even finished yet with the list of assumptions.
In the Needham-Schroeder protocol, the claim of authentication relies on the
fact that the nonces na and nb are only known to a and b, respectively. But
why wouldn’t a or b disclose these nonces?
Security Analyst: Well, they don’t. And yes, that is another assumption for
the trusted agents. So the claim is in fact conditional if we spell out the types
of the agents as follows: If both agent a and b are trusted then they can
identify each other after any run of the protocol.
Logician: The list of assumptions keeps growing. What worries me more is
that the list of quantifications is also rapidly growing.
Philosopher: Yes, indeed, it is.
Cognitive Scientist: What do you mean? Quantifications over what?
Logician: Well, first, if a principal sends an encrypted message, everybody
who does not possess the decryption key deems any other message possible.
Second, the bad guy or the so-called intruder of this Dolev-Yao model can do
anything anytime. He can insert messages, almost any message, and he can
delete messages that are sent.
Security Analyst: Yes, we have to be careful to keep our model manageable.
To answer your first point: we can assume trusted agents that only do pattern
matching to pick up the right messages. And I do agree with your remark
about quantifications: if we need to take into account all the possible behaviors
of non-trusted agents, the model grows huge! Another thing to bear in mind,
by the way, is that the fewer assumptions you make, the more general will be
your correctness proof. . .
Philosopher: Now let’s finally make a list of all the aspects of the modeling
we discussed.
Logician: Well, this is just preliminary, of course (Stands up and walks to the
whiteboard and draws):
• Protocol description
– executable protocol specification for each agent (who should do
what under what preconditions);
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– initial distribution of information and kept secrets (e.g. the infor-
mation about the names of participants, the public/private keys);
– requirements (what facts should be true at the end of the protocol
or even in the middle stage of a run of the protocol?)
• Assumptions
– primitives (what cryptographic primitives are used?)
– intruder model (what can the intruder do?)
– trusted agent model (how do they behave, reason and observe?)
– communication model (how the messages are sent and received,
related to agents’ observations.)
Cognitive Scientist: Well, you are the logician, what do you make of all these
questions?
Logician: The challenge is to find a logical system that fits these situations
like a glove. Actually, I do have some ideas for such a logic already. . .
Philosopher: That’s great! But for now I think we should call it a day. May
I invite you all to a delicious dinner at NIAS?
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